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International- Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction-The Lockerbie Tragedy:
Will Western Clout or International
Convention Win the Extradition War?
"'This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast -
man's laws, not God's - and if you cut them down .. .do you
really think you could stand upright in the winds that would
blow?' "1 Perhaps a more timely version of Sir Thomas More's ques-
tion might ask, "How much of the forest must be felled to keep in-
tact the might of the Western powers?" The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) recently demonstrated the insignificance of one more
type of tree - international conventions - by declaring them
subordinate to the orders of the United Nations Security Council
(UN).2 Cloaked in the name of justice, this announcement came af-
ter the United States and Britain asserted their UN clout in an at-
tempt to compel Libya to extradite two nationals indicted for the
1988 Lockerbie Tragedy.3
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed
while in-flight over Lockerbie, Scotland.4 All 259 people aboard, in
addition to 11 on the ground, were killed. 5 Within a week, British
investigations revealed that a bomb made of plastic explosives caused
the tragedy. Evidence uncovered over the next three years
culminated in the joint American-British indictment of two Libyan
intelligence agents.6 Relying on the Montreal Convention, however,
Libya refused to surrender its accused nationals to either the Ameri-
can or British judicial system. Over the next five months, a tripartite
extradition battle waged among the United States and Britain,
Libya, and the Security Council. Then, on April 14, 1992, the ICJ
1. H. Moss Crystle, Comment, When Rights Fall in a Forest ... The Ker-Frisbie Doc-
trine and American Judicial Countenance of Extraterritorial Abductions and Torture, 9
DICK. J. INTr'L L. 387, 408 (1991) (quoting R. Bolt, A Man For All Seasons, Act 1, in THREE
PLAYS 147 (L. Heineman, ed., 1967)).
2. Paul Lewis, Sanctions on Libya Begin to Take Hold As Deadline Passes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1992, at Al.
3. Marc Weller, Libyan Terrorism American Swagger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1992, at
23.
4. Jerry Seper & Paul Bedard, Two Indicted in Pan Am Deaths; Suspects Are Spies for
Libya, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at Al.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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demonstrated its willingness to liberally interpret international law
by refusing to grant Libya provisional measures against the Security
Council's ordered sanctions.7
By withholding disapproval of the West's actions, the ICJ sent a
message around the globe that terrorist activities were no longer gov-
erned by treaties and conventions among individual states, but rather
by the United Nations.8 This Note contends that the ICI's decision
drew lines for a new legal order led by the might of the West, and,
that under this current regime, Libya must extradite the accused to
the United States or risk further sanctions or possibly even a forcible
taking of the indicted men.9 Additionally, this Note asserts that
under both international and domestic law, the United States is a
valid arena for the Libyans' trial.
International law traditionally affords jurisdiction over extrater-
ritorial crimes on five bases: (1) territorial - based on the place
where the offense is committed; (2) national - based on the nation-
ality of the offender; (3) protective - based on injury to the national
interest; (4) universal - based on an offense considered so heinous
that it permits trial in any jurisdiction able to gain physical custody
of the accused; and (5) passive personal - based on the nationality
of the victim(s).10 Not all states subscribe to each of these five ten-
ets." Passive personal jurisdiction is the most hotly contested,12 and,
in conjunction with the universal and protective theories, is only ap-
plicable regarding specific offenses.13 Furthermore, jurisdiction
founded on any of the five is first burdened with securing custody of
the accused.1 '
By far the simplest means of physical arrest is for the alleged
offender to voluntarily surrender. Assuming this option is unavaila-
ble, nations generally rely on extradition arrangements. 5 Originally,
international law " 'obliged [states] to grant extradition freely and
without qualification or restriction.' "' Over time, the tide turned
7. Weller, supra note 3, at 23.
8. See Weller, supra note 3, at 23.
9. For purposes of this Note, only U.S. extradition is discussed. However, extradition
was requested by both the U.S. and London. After the Security Council Resolution on the
Pan Am Bombing, MIDDLE EAST NEWS NETWORK, Jan. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Currnt File.
10. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-900 (D.D.C. 1988). Territorial, na-
tional and universal bases of jurisdiction are inapplicable to the United States case; therefore,
this Note will focus on the universal and passive personal tenets only.
11. Wegner, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under International Law: The Yunis
Decision as a Model for the Prosecution of Terrorists in U.S. Courts, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 409, 417 (1991).
12. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 901.
13. Wenger, supra note 11.
14. See Wenger, supra note 11, at 418.
15. Extradition, 6 Whiteman DIGEST § 1, at 727.
16. See id. § 3, at 732 (quoting The State (Duggan) v. Tapley, 109 INT'L L. REP. 336,
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180 degrees, and the international community declared that, absent
a treaty, there was no legal duty to extradite fugitives to a foreign
state.'" In turn, nations entered treaties requiring one party to sur-
render its nationals to another for certain criminal acts."8 Ambiguity
remained, however, as the circumstances for extradition were limited
to specific offenses, 9 and some states flatly refused to hand over
their own nationals. 20
In the early 1970's, the international community reconsidered
extraterritorial jurisdiction in response to heightened concern over
drastically rising numbers of reported terrorist attacks.2' The move
was toward universal condemnation of specific crimes - in particu-
lar, aviation terrorism:22 "[U]nlawful acts against the safety of civil
aviation jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously af-
fect the operation of air services, and undermine the confidence of
the peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation . . . [T]he
occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave concern." 23
The response came in the form of several international conven-
tions which relaxed legal restrictions on the prosecution of foreign
nationals. Both the Organization of American States Convention on
Terrorism and the European Convention on the Suppression of Ter-
rorism specifically condemned aircraft piracy.24 Each Convention or-
dered states to take whatever measures were necessary to establish
jurisdiction over the alleged offender. 25 The 1971 Montreal Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation,
ratified by 137 nations,26 specifically labelled violent acts against air-
337 (1951)).
17. Id. § 3 at 732.
18. See id. § I at 727.
19. See id. § 3 at 733. The United States permits extradition solely in situations gov-
erned by an extradition agreement encompassing the particular offense committed. Id.
20. For example, Libya refuses to submit its nationals to American, British or French
jurisdiction because of the lack of extradition agreements. Gaddafi Says He Cannot Hand
Over Suspected Libyans, REUTERS, Nov. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt
File. The United States is also incapable of surrendering fugitives to foreign states absent an
extradition treaty. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-412 (1886); Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). This same policy is followed by Great Britain, Ca-
nada, El Salvador and the former Soviet Union. See Extradition, 6 Whiteman DIGEST § 4, at
733-735.
21. In 1971, 278 terrorist acts were reported, and by 1980 that number had increased
over 900% to 2,773. By 1989, 4,422 incidents with a death toll of 8,237 were reported. Weg-
ner, supra note 11, at 411.
22. See Wenger, supra note 11, at 417.
23. Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 568 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973)
[hereinafter Montreal Convention].
24. Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971,
27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413, P.A.U.T.S. 37; European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, 1137 U.N.T.S. 93.
25. Wegner, supra note 11, at 424.
26. Michael Milde, News from International Organizations, 13 AIR L. 95 (1988).
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craft in service27 as a universal crime28 and ordered states to "take
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
. . . offences . . . committed against or on board an aircraft regis-
tered in that State."29 Furthermore, when an alleged offender is
found within the jurisdiction of a party to the Convention, that state
must either extradite the accused or become "obliged, without ex-
ception whatsoever . . . to submit the case to its competent authori-
ties for the purpose of prosecution." 30 In addition to these Conven-
tions, the United States deemed attacks on aircraft as crimes of
universal concern in both the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law3 and recent caselaw.3 2
Following the universal condemnation of aircraft piracy and hi-
jacking, audiences became more receptive to the idea of passive per-
sonal jurisdiction. International conventions, once again led the way,
proclaiming that "jurisdiction may be justified on the passive per-
sonal principle. ' 33 In addition, this tenet was incorporated within the
criminal codes of several nations. 4 Even the United States, a long
time opponent of jurisdiction based on the victim's nationality, en-
acted the 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act
calling for the prosecution of "[w]hoever kills a national of the
United States, while such national is outside the United States. '35
Although the passive personal principle is still unlikely to be ac-
cepted as the sole basis for jurisdiction, its increased international
adoption indicates that, at a minimum, it is applicable regarding the
specific offenses cited in the Conventions. 6
In addition to the influx of multilateral conventions, an attitude
change regarding terrorism developed among the states. "The effect
of an incident on legal norms is ultimately a function of what rele-
vant elites are willing to accept as legitimate, ' '3 7 and the consensus
27. Id.
28. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 900.
29. Montreal Convention, supra note 23, art. 5, para. l(b), at 570.
30. Montreal Convention, supra note 23, art. 7, at 571.
31. "'A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as . . . attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft . . . and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.'" Wegner, supra note 11, at
425 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987)).
32. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 901; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 781, n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
33. Wegner, supra note 11, at 428. Examples of such include the Tokoyo, New York,
Hostage Taking and European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Wegner, supra
note 11, at 429.
34. The Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, France,
and the U.S. all have incorporated this principle into their criminal laws. Wegner, supra note
11, at 429.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (1986).
36. Wegner, supra note 11 at 429; See also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 896.
37. Gregory V. Gooding, Comment, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception
[Vol. 11:2
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indicated that a violation of international law was permissible so
long as states "'abided by its spirit to make sure justice was
done.' -38 Some crimes were now opposed so universally that nations
were called upon to take any necessary actions to gain jurisdiction
over the alleged perpetrators.3 9 This message was delivered as early
as 1960 when Israel received a mere "slap on the wrist" for its forci-
ble removal of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina.' Even more bellig-
erent was the American reaction to the Achille Lauro hijacking. Be-
lieving the perpetrators to be aboard an Egyptian airliner, American
military planes intercepted the flight and directed the plane to land
at the Sicily NATO Base."1 Criticism of the United States mission
was limited to the Arab nations while praises rang from America's
European allies, Canada, and Australia.' 2 Even the former Soviet
Union's news reporting agency agreed that "American anger over
the hijacking and murder [was] 'understandable and just.'
Even more startling was the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain." Humberto Alvarez-
Machain, a Mexican national, was kidnapped from his office in Gua-
dalajara, flown to Texas and arrested by United States Drug En-
forcement (DEA) officials for the kidnap and murder of an Ameri-
can DEA special-agent.' 5 Although the United States conceded the
shocking nature of Mr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction, and even that
such action might violate general principles of international law, the
Court refused to find a breach of the extradition treaty' 6 existing
between the United States and Mexico.' Lacking a legal niche
which would condemn the DEA's actions, the Court found the
United States had proper jurisdiction to try the defendant. 8 With
nations around the world condoning "illegal' 49 methods of bringing
of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE L.J. 158, 172 (1987).
38. Id. (quoting Israel: Papers Welcome Capture of PLA Hijackers, FBIS (Mid. East),
Oct. 15, 1986, at 113 (text from Davar)).
39. See id. at 158-79.
40. Id. at 161. Eichmann was taken to Israel and tried for Nazi war crimes. Id.
41. Id. at 166.
42. Gooding, supra note 37, at 170-72.
43. Id. at 173 (quoting From Soviet, Sympathy and a Barb for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1985, at 7).
44. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
45. Id. at 2190.
46. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States - United Mexican States, 31 U.S.T.
5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
47. The extradition arrangement between the United States and Mexico "does not pur-
port to specify the only way in which one country may gain custody of a national of the other
country for the purposes of prosecution." Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194. As abduction
was not specifically included within the language of the agreement, the Court found that the
treaty - which would prevent the United States from taking Mexican nationals against Mex-
ico's will - was inapplicable. See id.
48. Id. at 2197.
49. See Gooding, supra note 37, at 172.
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alleged terrorists to trial, a movement developed declaring terrorism
a special problem calling for extraordinary measures."0 Apparently
these measures now include the accused's forcible removal to the de-
sired jurisdiction.
Thus, the formation of a new "chaotic" international regime be-
gan. Nations, once the major proponents of multilateral treaties and
conventions, now apply only those laws which conveniently work to
their favor. The current United States-Libya situation serves as a
perfect example of the "elite" attempting to break down those pillars
of international law which are adverse to Western goals.
Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah are ac-
cused of planting and detonating the bomb aboard Pan Am Flight
103 and murdering 270 persons. 1 The United States requested that
Libya extradite the two intelligence agents. Relying on both the lack
of an extradition treaty 2 and the Montreal Convention, 53 Libya re-
fused all such requests.6 Instead Libya arrested the suspects and
initiated a judicial inquiry into the matter. Under the Convention,
"Libya can either extradite or try individuals in its own courts who
are accused of 'placing on an aircraft in service . . . a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft.' "66 Libya went
even a step further by offering to admit both British and American
observers to the Libyan trial, 6 or, in the alternative, to have the ICJ
determine which nation has the proper jurisdiction. 7
The United States responded with complete inflexibility. First,
the Americans claimed that the Montreal Protocol was not meant to
encompass "'state-sponsored terrorism,' "5 and that the Libyan
courts were "unlikely to convict agents who may have been on an
official, though illegal, mission." 59 Second, according to the United
States, Libya's traditional involvement in terrorism rendered it un-
qualified to pass judgment on such activities.6" Unable to obtain
compliance, the Americans tried a new approach: the United Na-
50. Id. at 177.
51. Seper & Bedard, supra note 4.
52. After the Security Council Resolution on the Pan Am Bombing, supra note 9.
53. The U.S., U.K., and Libya are all signatories to the Montreal Convention.
54. Weller, supra note 3.
55. Weller, supra note 3.
56. Weller, supra note 3.
57. Weller, supra note 3.
58. Dave Todd, Terror: U.S., Libya Battling Over Suspects, CALGARY HERALD, Mar.
25, 1992, at AS.
59. Weller, supra note 3.
60. Libya provides facilities and millions of dollars to several terrorist groups including
the Abu Nidal Organization, the PLO, and the PFLP-GC. Seper & Bedard, supra note 4.
Additionally, "Libya has long offered a safe haven for such terrorists as Abul Abas, the mas-
termind behind the hijacking of the Achille Lauro." Jonathan Miller, A Missed Opportunity,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 21, 1992, at 18.
[Vol. 11:2
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tions Security Council. 61
Both Libya and the United States, as members of the UN, are
bound "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and re-
moval of threats to the peace."" The Charter of the United Nations
gives the Security Council the power to "determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,"
and to impose peace-keeping measures.63 Relying on this document,
the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 731 urging
"'the Libyan government to provide a full and effective response to
those requests [for extradition] so as to contribute to the elimination
of international terrorism . . . [and] urg[ing] all states individually
and collectively to encourage the Libyan Government to respond
fully and effectively to those requests.'64
Due to Libya's continued noncompliance, the Security Council
delivered Libya an ultimatum through Resolution 748 in March
1992: Extradite within fifteen days or face mandatory air, military
and diplomatic sanctions.65 Still unwilling to budge,66 the Libyans
asked the ICJ to declare that they were fulfilling their obligations
under the Montreal Convention and that no measures were appropri-
ate to encourage Libya to extradite.6 7 However, on April 14, 1992,
the ICJ declared that "the circumstances were not such as to require
the Court to exercise its power . . . to indicate provisional mea-
sures."" In reaching its decision, the ICJ relied on the fact that the
Charter of the United Nations gives its own provisions precedent
over those of any international agreement where the two are in con-
flict,69 and, furthermore, that signatories are required to "accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council.1 70
Whether justice or merely the passing needs of the West were
served by the ICJ's ruling is now a moot question. The moral of the
decision is twofold. First, the Security Council is "a tool of the inter-
ests of Britain, France, and the US. '71 Agreements once the staples
of international law must now bow to the decisions of the Security
Council - traditionally a political organ - when it comes to legal
disputes.72 Second, extradition is no longer a national act.78 Sanc-
61. Weller, supra note 3.
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
63. Id. art. 39.
64. After the Security Council Resolution on the Pan Am Bombing, supra note 9.
65. Lewis, supra note 2.
66. Lewis, supra note 2.
67. Provisional Measures Not Appropriate in Libya Case, THE TIMES, May 7, 1992.
68. Id.
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 13.
70. Id. art. 25.
71. Miller, supra note 60.
72. See Libya: Lockerbie Extradition Case Opens in the Hague, INTER PRESS, Mar. 26,
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tions, rather than treaties, are the legally superior means of bringing
an alleged terrorist to a foreign state for trial. The states have set a
new standard for dealing with aviation terrorists: extradite or extra-
dite. Libya's only real choice then is to send Megrahi and Fhimah to
the United States to stand trial. The ICJ has shown Libya "the writ-
ing on the wall" by condoning international sanctions for any contin-
ued refusal to do so. Additionally, since the legal community already
accepted luring, interception and abduction as viable methods of
bringing terrorists to trial in foreign states,7 4 if sanctions fail, the
United States could legally "capture" the accused Libyans. Whether
by extradition or force, once Megrahi and Fhimah are within the
United States, both international7 5 and domestic law7 6 permit their
prosecution.
The international legal order designed to protect future genera-
tions from the threat of war 77 has been reduced to disorder. The in-
ternational community previously attempted to equalize nations by
assuring both large and small countries comparable rights and re-
sponsibilities within the legal order. This policy of equalization no
longer prevails. Currently, those who are politically strongest wield
the "double-dulled sword": Jurisdiction over alleged aviation ter-
rorists is established through convention, treaty and judicial prece-
dent, yet the elite can dismiss the same if custody problems arise.
Meanwhile, smaller nations are left at the mercy of whatever West-
ern political pressure manages to push past the Security Council. In-
stead of a search for justice, international law becomes a matter of
clout. Ironically, with the ICJ's decision, the liberty and justice
Americans value so dearly78 was sold out to the might of the West.
Libya may yet extradite Megrahi and Fhimah. However, Liby-
ans, no less than the people of any other state, cling tightly to the
values of national legitimacy and sovereignty.79 Regardless of
whether the trial is held in an American or Libyan courtroom, an old
legal "tree" was axed to accommodate the West's insatiable desire
for "justice."
Barbara A. Timmeney
1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 36, 3.
73. See Extradition, supra note 15, at 728.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); see also Gooding, supra note 37.
75. As described above, the universal and passive personal principles of jurisdiction com-
bine to provide adequate bases for an American trial.
76. See generally, United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2338
(1986); 18 U.S.C. §§ 31-32 (1988).
77. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
78. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
79. After the Security Council Resolution on the Pan Am Bombing, supra note 9.
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